Radstats: Biology, Society and Cognitive Capacities: from Genetic Reductionism to Historical Materialism

Radical
Statistics

Biology, Society and Cognitive Capacities: from Genetic Reductionism to Historical Materialism

Peter Dickens

Introduction

The Bell Curve offers a biologically-based understanding of human intelligence and success (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). People, it is argued, are successful if they are innately intelligent. To put this in more social scientific terms, social stratification and inequality is a result of people's inbuilt intellectual capacities. The book has become famous, having sold several hundred thousand copies, been the subject of a presidential press conference and of cover stories in many news and opinion magazines. At the same time it has become infamous and subjected to vitriolic critique, mainly from radical social scientists and activists. They find its biologically-based analysis to be deeply flawed, not least for its wilful misinterpretation of selected texts (Nisbett, 1995). Furthermore it consistently confuses correlation with explanation, 'success' being correlated with 'IQ' (Sowell, 1995). Similarly the book's explanation of social 'success' has frequently been found suspect, relying wholly on people's inbuilt characteristics as distinct from the circumstances into which they are born and develop (Gould, 1995). For the book's critics it is a little more than a revival of old-fashioned Social Darwinism, this time armed by the science of genetics.

As we will see, these criticisms are in many respects justified. The danger is, however, that biologically-based understandings of human abilities will become completely rejected by radical social scientists. Biological explanation may well remain solely the prerogative of the reactionary right. But why should this continue to be so? Why should not those of a Left or Left-liberal persuasion also not have access to biological understandings of human practices and well-being? Furthermore, what would an alternative account look like, one which used insights from biology while rejecting the suggestion that society is more than a collection of genetically-powered individuals? This paper therefore offers not only a critique of The Bell Curve but an alternative understanding of human cognitive capacities and how they come to be formed. This entails combining insights from historical materialsm with emergent forms of biology where the emphasis is no longer on genes per se.

The Bell Curve's Arguments

First let us briefly remind ourselves in a little more detail of arguments in The Bell Curve. In fact the book's emphasis has often been misunderstood or misinterpreted. In particular, it has been argued that its main message concerns are the supposed low IQ levels of black people. 'Race', however, forms only a small part of the book. Similarly, the book makes little reference to genetics, even though genetic inheritance is a tacit theme.

The Bell Curve's central message is actually about the class structure of modern America. It relies centrally on what Herrnstein and Murray call 'cognitive ability.' It is those with such an ability, 'the cognitive elite', who are likely to rise into the elite of well-paid jobs.

The twentieth century dawned on a world segregated into social classes defined in terms of money, power and status. The ancient lines of separation based on hereditary rank were being erased, replaced by a more complicated set of overlapping lines. Social standing still played a major role, if less accompanied by a sword or tiara, but so did out-and-out wealth, educational credentials and, increasingly, talent. Our thesis is that the twentieth century has continued this transformation, so that the twenty-first will open on a world in which cognitive ability is the dividing force. The shift is more subtle than the previous one but more momentous. Social class remains the vehicle of social life, but intelligence now pulls the train (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994: 25).

The central idea, therefore, is that America is a meritocracy. In a society where the premium for successful and well-paid work is intelligence, people are getting the jobs for which they are mentally cut out. The intelligentsia of whatever class is being selected (and, through interbreeding is selecting itself) to become a cognitive elite. These people thereby find themselves in the upper management of the thrusting new industries. The mirror image of this same process is, of course, that of an underclass of people working in unfulfilling and ill-paid jobs precisely because they have not inherited adequate intellectual capacities to compete in a society which relies on the making and understanding of information. Unfortunately for American society, it is argued, these people are increasing at a much faster level than the cognitive elite. Fortunately, however, little needs to be done in terms of public policy. Social and welfare programmes such as Head Start and Affirmative Action are deemed to be largely useless by The Bell Curve since they cannot alter the basic genetic inheritance of the cognitively-deficient underclass. Not only are they useless but they could even be counter-productive. They may, for example, raise false expectations, frustrated expectations and social disorder. Much the best thing is for the underclass to accept their genetic fates and recognise that there may be substantial psychic rewards in jobs that are not well-paid.

Difficulties with The Bell Curve: 'IQ' and Genetics

All the above arguments crucially depend first, of course, on what 'IQ' actually is. This remains both an area of lively debate and a first stumbling-block in relating intelligence to biology (Hunt, 1997; Plomin, 1999). Herrnstein and Murray consider themselves to be what they call 'classicists', relying on the very early work of Spearman and arguing that intelligence can be measured by a single measure called 'g'. This is defined as a person's capacity for carrying out complex mental work. Other measures could have been used, but these are explicitly rejected. One such is that outlined by Sternberg (1985). He tries to understand what people are actually doing when exercising their 'intelligence.' One person may, for example, be excellent at composing sentences but useless as spatial visualisation. Somewhat similarly, Gardner (1983) has long argued for a recognition of multiple intelligences. Some people, for example, may have particular linguistic skills. Others may have special artistic, mathematical or musical abilities. Therefore a general purpose g is argued to be peculiarly hopeless in these circumstances.

These are very important matters. Nevertheless, Hernnstein and Murray whole argument depends on the notion of a general g, arguing that all other measures of people's abilities are to some degree assessing this general measure. Furthermore, another reason for hanging on to the 'IQ', according to The Bell Curve, is that it accords well with a popularly held notion of intelligence or 'smartness.'

Most importantly, they argue that cognitively ability has indeed been largely established as heritable. Not less than 40% of IQ is inherited, they argue, a figure which may be as high as 80%. All this brings us to a second major stumbling block to these arguments. What actually is the relation between biology and 'intelligence' or 'general cognitive ability'? The fact is that these links are a very long way from being established. Robert Plomin is one of the best-known researchers in this field, one who has conducted research in this area and has offered general support to Herrnstein and Murray in their attempts to link biology to IQ. Press reports suggest Plomin's work has indeed demonstrated a close link between genes and intelligence. Take, for example, the following press cutting:

Scientists Discover Gene That Creates Human Intelligence

The first gene that influences human intelligence has been found by scientists, a discovery with huge social and educational implications. The research could herald the development of genetic tests to target potential high-flyers, pave the way to IQ-boosting drugs and will raise fears that embryos that lack smart genes could be aborted. The gene, believed to be the first of many of many that contribute to normal intelligence, has been found after a six-year search by a team headed by Prof. Robert Plomin of the Institute of Psychiatry in London.... 'I really think this is a breakthrough', he said. Neuroscientists will now study how this gene works to affect the functioning of the brain, ending years of argument over whether genes can affect intelligence. 'It is hard to argue with a piece of DNA', he said....' (Daily Telegraph, 31 October 1997)

And yet in his most recent review of the field, Plomin (1999) is remarkably candid about these complex matters. He shows that that there are so far few, if any, established connections between genes and 'IQ'.

I have no doubt that genes associated with g will be identified, although how much of the genetic variance will be accounted for by individual genes is uncertain. This is because the magnitude of the effects of genes in multiple gene systems is not yet know for g or for any other trait or disorder controlled by a number of different genes... Despite the formidable challenges of trying to find genes of small effect, I predict that most of the heritability of g will be accounted for eventually by specific genes, if hundreds of genes are needed to do it (1999 C28).

Plomin then goes on to discuss the social and scientific implications of finding such genes. But it seems meanwhile that, after all, the genetic 'science' of intelligence is, to say, the least, ill-formed. Virtually no connection between specific genes and g and 'intelligence' or 'general cognitive capacity' has so far been established. Readers of Radical Statistics may wish to speculate as to why a leading advocate in this field should on the one hand allow the press (and, more recently a TV documentary) to announce a major break-through in which these connections are supposedly established while on the other hand admitting in a prestigious scientific journal that there are virtually no known connections between genes and intelligence. The hunger of the media for 'a good story' may be part of the story, 'the media' in this case being a broadsheet known for its support of conservative views. The need for academics to remain 'high profile' to attract research-funds may be another element.

'Intelligence': the Debate Continues

As we will see shortly, an explanation of differences in human intellectual capacities almost certainly needs to get away from genes per se. But before turning to an alternative explanatory strategy we should note that this continues to be an area of continuing discussion and debate (Neisser et al, 1996). There remains the continuing issue of what g actually is. Some people may, for example, thrive when it comes to tests of verbal ability and others do well on spatial aptitudes. It does seem that there are significant correlations between these different types of capacity. According to Neisser et al, working on behalf of the American Psychological Association, g is not a bad first shot in assessing human intellectual capacities. But this is by no means the end of the story. Gardner's insistence on 'multiple intelligences' is still not recognised by the catch-all g. Furthermore there are problems with evaluating g and 'IQ'. The latter measurement is difficult to undertake on very small children, for example. This is because infants are still rapidly developing their intellectual capacities and the picture is far from static. Furthermore, even when intelligence test scores are attempted on young children, they turn out to be a poor predictor of scores attained in individuals' later lives. One study cited by Neisser et al showed an average change between the ages of 12 and 17 was 7.1 points, with some levels changing by as much as 18 points.

But, second, recent empirical work also cited by Neisser et al indicates that Herrnstein and Murray were wrong to attribute such little significance to social context. The fact, for example, that school achievement is highest amongst those with the highest IQs can be a commentary on the ways in which teachers encourage those pupils who seem most receptive to education. This suggests at least a complex interaction between inborn abilities and social or educational circumstances. Furthermore, measures of status and income do not correlate neatly with an individual's 'cognitive capacities.' Empirical work cited by Neisser et al shows they also relate to the social status and income of parents. The social-cum-physical environment also relates to cognitive capacities in other more complex ways. As Neisser and others have reported, malnutrition, exposure to toxic substances, prenatal and perinatal stress have all been shown to correlate with lower levels of 'intelligence.' Daniels et al, (1997) point to the fact that much of the human brain's growth takes place in utero, and they produce statistics on twins' development to argue strongly that factors such as the mother's diet, alcohol consumption, drug use and cigarette consumption all have a particular significance, one which again considerably reduces the relative significance of genes (See also McGue, 1997; Robertson, 1999). The fact that twins may grow up with similar cognitive capacities may well have more to do with their shared uterine environment than the fact that they are genetically similar.

Furthermore, there is now a fast-growing literature which shows that how a child is treated in infancy, childhood and adolescence strongly affects how she or he develops in later life. (See, for example, Montgomery et al, 1996; 1997; Marmot and Wadsworth, 1997; Keating and Herzman, 1999; Brooks-Gunn et al, 1999.). Emotional stability, educational performance, social mobility and cognitive capacities (measured in terms of verbal ability, reasoning ability and visual ability as well as more conventional measures of 'intelligence') have all been demonstrated to be closely related to how a child is brought up in the home, at school and the wider society. These arguments, which are backed up by extensive empirical research, again place a large question mark over arguments that intellectual capacities or incapacities are genetically hard-wired into the human population and that 'success' or otherwise is simply a product of biological make-up. And the social and political implications (including the implications for social policy) are, needless to say, in complete contrast with those of The Bell Curve. Public intervention can indeed make an important difference to intellectual capacities and social mobility.

In short, the work on which Herrnstein and Murray depended has now come under serious fire. Major issues of human development, of the infant's early development and of the person's life-experience must be made to come to the fore in offering an explanation of human being's intellectual capacities. The result is that the explanation turns from the causal powers of the gene per se and towards the organism in context. Note, however, that biology stays in the frame. Genes are causal mechanisms but the implication here is that they act in concert with one another and in relation to their physical and social environments.

The Subsumption of Human Biology to Capital: Towards an Alternative Explanation

All the above arguments suggest the need for a radically different theoretical starting-point. So far The Bell Curve has only been subjected to critique. The time has now come for an alternative set of theoretical formulations. As regards biology, there is an old, and until recently neglected, intellectual tradition which would be a key part of an alternative. It focuses on the biological organism as a whole and its relation to the environment. It is now used to deliberately argue against the kinds of genetic reductionism which dominate contemporary biology and biological explanations of intelligence in particular (See, for example, Lewontin, 1982; 1991, Wills, 1993).

Conrad Waddington is one of the key authors here (1957; 1975). His early work on fruit flies, in which he measured the effect of environmental shocks on their life-time development and long-term evolution, led to his early metaphor of an 'epigenetic landscape'. Waddington's view is now seen by a growing number of biologists as broadly correct, even if his knowledge of genes was not as complete as is now possible. An organism, Waddington argued, can be seen as a ball developing as it rolls down one of a number of genetically-influenced 'valleys', each set of valleys being different according to the genetic composition of individuals (Fig.1). Genes influence the form of these valleys. But this influence is at one remove in the sense that it is not the genes themselves that do the influencing but chemicals stemming from combinations of genes (Fig.2). An organism, such as a human being, is relatively robust and not easily deflected from one 'valley' to another. But while stability and robustness may be the norm, environmental changes or random genetic changes to the organism itself may indeed result in a shift from developmental pathway to another and a different developmental outcome. Importantly for Waddington 'ontogeny' or life-time development may have important long-term evolutionary effects. Over time some populations will emerge with pathways which are better-suited to the new conditions. And it will be they who are best able to survive and leave offspring. In this way ontogeny is linked to phylogeny, or long-term evolution.

CLick HERE for Figure 1: The epigenetic landscape

(Source: C H Waddington (1975) The Evolution of an Evolutionist)
Note: Fig. 1 represents what Waddington saw as the underlying, relatively robust, nature of development - one which does not necessarily entail immediate response to genetic change or to stress from the external environment. The ball represents the developing organism. The landscape is genetically determined and varies between individuals. The valleys are 'necessary paths' down which the organism passes. Note that the genetic landscape of the individual considerably influences the form and direction of the developing organism but does not absolutely determine it. A number of necessary paths could be taken but (as the valley metaphor suggests) it involves a major genetic change (or environmental shock) to affect the 'necessary path' or 'chreod' of the developing organism. Change from one pathway to another becomes more difficult as the development process proceeds. All this is in contrast with the neo-Darwinism paradigm in which the organism and its behaviour is a straightforward expression of its genetic structure.

Waddington also believed that these effects on organisms have, in the long term, major implications for long-term evolution. Over time, the population will be characterised by a higher proportion of organisms with 'better' epigenetic landscapes. They will emerge as better adapted to environmental shocks.

CLick HERE for Figure 2: The complex system of interactions underlying the epigenetic landscape

(Source: C H Waddington (1957) The Strategy of Genes) Note: Fig. 2 is Waddington's representation of the relation between genes and the epigenetic landscape. The pegs in the ground represent genes; the strings leading from them the chemical tendencies produced by the genes. The modelling of the epigenetic landscape, which slopes down from above one's head towards the distance, is controlled by the pull of these numerous guy-ropes which are ultimately anchored to the genes. Note that the organism's epigenetic landscape is not a direct product of the genes but is the result of complex interactions between chemicals released by the genes.

The important thing to note in this picture is that genetic reductionism is avoided. There is no suggestion of, for example a gene, or indeed genes, 'for intelligence.' There may be sets of genes influencing the intellectual capacities of human beings (as represented by the pathways along which the organism develops) but these do not determine the final outcome. This will also depend on the environmental 'shocks' to which it is subject during its development process. Note, however, that biology is full implicated in human development, the acquisition of intellectual capacities and the like. Waddington's work formed the basis of the work of the famous developmental biologist, Jean Piaget. He too suggested that the child develops along a set of developmental pathways which allowed the child to slowly acquire the capacity for abstract thought. Nevertheless he also insisted that the early stages in human life are extraordinarily sensitive. What happens to a child is likely to deeply influence how that infant develops during their later life or, to use Waddington's analogy, which pathway they are likely to proceed down.

The picture originally developed by Waddington also allows for the possibility of sub-populations of people who have indeed acquired certain kinds of capacity in relation to a particular kind of social-cum-physical environment. In this sense, and despite the fact that this 'new' form of biology is still under active development, we come back to a picture similar to that of The Bell Curve; some groups of people whose biologies leave them physically and mentally well-endowed and other groups of people who do not have the same intellectual capacities. In this way, then, biology remains fully implicated in human intellectual capacities, but of course this conceptual framework leaves social and environmental relations recognised as fully involved in the development and even evolution of human-beings. The causal powers involved are therefore much less genes on their own but complexes of genes relating to external shocks to influence the life-course and the development of human capacities. In this way we can envisage the empirical critiques of The Bell Curve, and the recognition that this critique could easily have disastrous social consequences, are recognised and are used to develop an alternative conceptual framework.

Marx's historical materialism, a perspective giving particular significance to the social relations involved in material production, is a possible second element of an alternative starting-point. More specifically, Marx's theory of subsumption, radically extended beyond his original conception, offers, in conjunction with the above forms of biology and developmental psychology, a potentially very suggestive way forward . Marx laid out his theory of 'formal' and 'real' subsumption of labour to capital in Capital, Volume 1. The 'formal' process is 'the direct subordination of labour to capital, irrespective of the state of the former's technological development.' (1976:1034). 'Real' subsumption is the thorough-going transformation of labour-processes and the relations of production under distinct social and technological conditions. The worker thereby becomes thoroughly subsumed, as an operative subservient to the machine. The implication of this paper, however, is that subsumption may be even more far-reaching than Marx suggested. Since at least the late 18th century we have witnessed a process whereby mental work has been separated from popular, experiential, knowledge. Social and technical divisions of labour reflect these divisions (Dickens, 2000; 2001). A similar process is now affecting many developing societies and they are being embedded in the biological and mental powers of different groups of people (Mies and Shiva, 1993). The key point is that, over the long run, capital (in conjunction with adaptive biological capacities) appears to have been shaping human biology and mental capacities in its own image. To put this another way, the genetically-endowed propensities for human beings to develop, grow and die are being harnessed by capital to make distinct biological-cum-social classes of people.

These are of course speculations, but they are speculations which are theoretically-grounded and based on emergent forms of biology, developmental psychology and epidemiology. They fully incorporate biology into an understanding of human capacities and yet they point to forms of politics which are wholly at odds with those of The Bell Curve. Nevertheless, this is not the end of the story. First, the kind of social picture emerging here is full of potential contradictions. The continuing creation of groups of people with well-enhanced capacities for handling abstract ideas may be in some sense good for the management of capitalist social relations but it may be bad for the maintenance of harmonious human relations. Second, it should be stressed that the 'new' (actually quite old) form of biology and developmental psychology outlined above does not imply that intelligence or any other kind of capacity is firmly and irrevocably fixed into particular groups of human beings. Over time, and given alternative kinds of social relations, we can envisage the emergence of alternative types of skills and cognitive capacities. Human beings are robust and flexible, and indeed these qualities which have enabled them to survive for so long relative to other species. They are also able to reconstruct themselves and their societies, if necessary over long periods of time. A fusion of the new types of biology outlined here with critical social science such as that originally developed by Marx implies hope for the future rather than reactionary conservatism and despair of The Bell Curve.